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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HAROLD C. FULLERt
Plaintiff and Respondentt
vs.

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH~
N.A., Executor of the Estate of Fae L.
Fuller t De ceased,
Def~ndant

Case
No. 9086

and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The plaintiff in this action and his wife, Fae L . Fuller~
had for some fifteen years been estranged~ and the plaintiff
had sought in vain to obtain the consent of Mrs. Fuller to
a divorce (Tr. p. 31, lines 5-9). In the summer of 1957 Mr.
and Mrs. Fuller agreed tentatively to the terms of a divorce, and they went to visit Mr. Frank E. Moss to discuss
the obtaining of a divorce. Distribution of the property to
be made in the divorce proceeding was agreed upon (Tr.

p. 10_, lines 14·23).

Pursuant to this Wlderstanding, Mr. Moss drafted a
Complaint wb i ch, at the trial of this c aset was introduced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

in evidence and designated as "Exhibit 5t- and in this Complaint he asked the court to award to Mrs. Fuller the property at 105 ~'B~" Street, in Salt Lake City~ and pursuant to
the dis cu ssio n and agreement of the parties in paragraph 6~
he asked the court to exonerate Mr. Fuller from paying any
alimony after the apartment house at 1OS ~'B '' Street had
been paid for.
~rhe

Complaint as drafted asked the court to award
to the plaintiff~ Mrs. Fuller, tb e sum of $40.00 per week
for support and maintenance, and when the plaintiff eJtamined the prepared Complaint he refused to sign the
waiver prepared by the attorney because it was his understanding that no fixed alimony would be asked for. He
thereafter talked to Mrs. Fuller t and it was agreed between
them that no fixed alimony would be asked for, and that
she would simply trust bim to pay an amount necessary for
her requirements in addition to her receiving the 11 B'" Street
property (Tr~ p. 13,. lines 9-12).

Subsequently Mr. Fuller was notified by Mr. Moss"s
office to come in and sign papers pursuant to the divorce,
and believing that a complete understanding was had, and
that the signing of the papers was necessary for the con·
summation of the divorce proceeding, he went to the office
of Mr. Moss and was asked by his secretary to sign a deed
pursuant to the request of Mr. Mossts secretary, but did not
sign the waiver because the Complaint had not been
amended as he understood it should have been (Tr. p.. 12,
lines 27-30 and p. 13~ lines 1-18). Since Attorney Moss was
not present he could not discuss with him the fact that he
and Mrs . Fuller had agreed to eliminate the fixed alimony
request from the Complaint (Tr. p. 13 11 lines 19. . 30).
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Subsequent to the signing of the deed the parties agreed
between themselves to postpone the divorce proceedings,
and Mrs. Fuller advised Mr. Moss of this factt and on
November 22, l957t Mr. Moss wrote a letter to Mr . Fuller,
which letter has been introduced in evidence and designated
as '~Exhibit 7" in which Mr. Moss said:

"'Your wife called this morning to say that she is
willing to postpone any further action in the divorce
proceedings until springtime because she knows that
you will be having financial problems through the
winter in the moving picture business .
She expressed con£ idence that you would continue to send her money for her support as you have
been doingt and she is willing to postpone action
so that your credit will reflect a part ownership in
the equity of the apartment house. Consequentlyt 1
will keep these papers on file until some time next
spring.
At your wifets suggestion I am enclosing statement for the time and paper work done to date.
Yours very truly.)

MOSS & COWLEY
By Is! Frank E . Moss.'t
Before the parties determined to resume the divorce
and the property settlement the matter was interrupted by
the untimely death of Mrs . Fuller. At the time of the death
of Mrs. Fuller the property at lOS

.uBtt

Street was held in

joint tenancy between Mr. and Mrs . Fuller..

The First
Security Bank, having been duly appointed as the Administrator of the Estate of Mrs . Fuller) contended that the
deed executed pursuant to the divorce negotiations was a
valid conveyance of the property.. The plaintiff herein
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£iled suit against the First Security Bank to quiet title to
the property at 105 ',;B~' Streett contending that the deed
was not a completed conveyance but was made pursuant to
the contemplated divorce,. and was never intended to be an
in tervi vos gift or conveyance to Mrs.. Fuller. The trial
court held in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

POINT I
THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED WAS UN..

DERSTOOO BY BOTH PARTIES TO BE ONLY
AN INCIDENT OF THE DIVORCE PROCEED..
INGS AND WAS,... NOT INTENDED TO BE A
PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY UNLESS THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS WERE EFFECTED~ THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
The def en dan t appellant argues at great length that
it was the intent of the parties that the property at 105 "B~
Street should be presently conveyed to Mrs . Fuller in ordel'
to provide income for her whether the divorce was consummated or not,. and much argument is made of the fact
that Mrs . Fuller actually collected the rents and paid the
bills; however, the evidence is clear that Mrs . Fuller collected the rents and paid the bills prior to any divorce contemplated, and that she had always collected the rents and
handled the money on this property (Tr. p. 22~ lines 2-11).
It is not di.fficult from the evidence to determine what the
actual intent and understanding of the parties was. Mr.
Frank E. Moss, a cornpe tent and qualified attorney of many
years ex perie nee would certainly not have prepared a ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plaint asking that the property at lOS ~'B'' Street be awarded
by the court to the plaintiff, Mrs. Fuller. had the deed
included as part of the property settlement contemplated
in the divorce, been intended to be a present conveyance.
lf the property had already been conveyed there would
have been no purpose to ask the court for relief in this
respect. Further~ it would be inconceivable that Mr. Moss
would write the letter on November 22~ 1957, designated
as '~Exhibit 7'"1 in the proceedings~ advising Mr Fuller that
Mrs. Fuller desired the divorce proceedings to be stayed
until the following spring on condition that he continue to
provide her with the support payments in order that his
credit would reflect a one-half ownership in the property
at lOS HB'' Street. Surely i£ this property had already been
conveyed such a scheme would be a fraud upon Mr~ Fuller"s
creditors, and it would be highly unlikely that a respected
and responsible attorney would be a party to such a fraud.
r

It is obvious from the letter of November 22 that the
deed already deposited with the secretary of Mr. Moss was
not intended to have any force and effect until the divorce
had been consummated; and further, that Mr. Moss considered himself an escrow holder of these papers. Hence
the language in the letter:
...

~~she

is willing to postpone action so that your
credit will reflect a part ownership in the equity
of the apartment house. Consequently 1 I will keep
these papers on file until some time next spring/'
(Italics supplied).

These papers referred not only to the deed, but to the Complaint, waivert and other documents drafted by Mr. Moss
pursuant to the divorce agreement, and it was certainly
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understood as o£ November 22t 1957t that these documents
should not have any force and effect until the following
spring. This is further substantiated by the testimony of Mr.
Moss'"s secretary,. Phyllis Porter, who testified that Mrs.

Fuller called and asked that the papers be held in abeyance
until the following spring (Tr4 p4 35, lines 27-30 i p. 35,
lines 1-11). Mrs . Porter further testified that the instructions she had were to keep the papers, including the deedt
in the file and to deliver them to no one, including Mrs.
FuHer (Tr~ p. 36~ lines 10-14) ~
Shortly after Mrs. Fuller had advised to hold every·
thing in abeyance, Mr. Moss submitted a bill for the work
done to date to Mr. FuHer, which was paid by him (Tr. p.
36, lines 15-20)~ The defendanfs own witnesst Mr~ Frank
E . Masst testified that when the initial papers pursuant to
the divorce were draftedt and the deed had been signed by
Mrs~ Fuller~ Mrs~ Fuller called and asked that the entire
matter be held in abeyance! and that everything be held up
until she called him again (Tr. p. S6t lines 27-30; p. 57J lines

l-S).

Mr. Moss further testified:
"THE COURT: WelL is it your understanding
from your conversation with these persons that this
deed was executed as a part of this divorce proceed~
ing and settlement of her property rights in that
divorce?·
A. Well the two coincided, Judge, and I am sure
that this deed grew out of this whole conv-ersation .
However~ I understand that he had executed the
deed and given it to her for the property.

THE COURT:

For what reason?

A.. Preparatory to the divorce.
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THE COURT:

I see.

MR. HYDE: And in consideration of her agreement to divorce him,. isnl't that true?
A~

At least in partt yes/'

(Tr . p. 62! lines 25-30;
p . 63, lines 1-8)

Hence~ it was clear both to the

plaintiff and to the
plaintiff~s attorney that the deed signed in the office of
Mr . Moss and held in the file as part of the divorce papers
was not to be delivered or effective until the divorce was
completed~ and that the deed was given, as Mr . Moss testifiedt in consideration at least in part for the divorce.. (Tr.
p. 63t lines 3-8).
It is elementary law that a deed is only effective if it
ts signed with the intent of making conveyance to the
grantee, and that if the deed is signed pursuant to a plan
which is never consummated, then there is no valid conveyance and the title remains where it was prior to the
execution of the deed .
In 16 American Jurisprudence~ p. 506t the text writer
explains the legal effect of a delivery by a grantor to a
third person of a deed to take effect on the happening of
a contingency; Le.~ in this caset the completion of the divorce proceedings~

"Section 12 3~ Conditional deli very to gran teean instrument may be delivered in escrow to a third
person to be kept by such third person until the
performance of a condition or the happening of an
event" which, on the performance of the condition or
the happening of the contingency specified~ becomes
operative as a deed and passes legal title . ~'
The court in this case made a specific finding that it
was understood between the parties that all documents perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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taining to the divorce proceedings~ including the deed

executed by the plaintiff to the uBt' Street propertyJ would
be held until the divorce was consummated (Tr . p. 71.; par.
4 of Findings of Fact). This finding of the trial court was

impelled by the evidence of the witnesses called at the trial
of this case.
The

plaintiff~

Harold C..

Fuller~

testified repeatedly

that the only purpose he had in executing the deed was

to complete the necessary papers for tbe obtaining of the
divorce, and that it was never his intention that title to the
property should pass until the divorce was obtained (Tr. pp.
1g and 20; p. 28, lines 2?-30; p. 30, lines 1-20).. Mr. Moss's
secretary~ Phyllis Porter~ had been instructed to keep the
deed with the rest of the divorce papers and not deliver
them to anyone (Tr. p~ 36~ lines 7-14).. It was obviously the
understanding of Mr. Moss~ the attorney for Mrs. Fuller,
that the deed would be held in escrow in his office subject
to the completion of the divorce proceedings because he did
not record the deed. He asked for the award of the property in his Complaint, which would have been a vain pleada
ing had the property already been conveyed prior to the
obtaining of the decree~ and he testified that the giving of
the deed was at least in part the consideration for the di ..
vorce. The court made special inquiry of Mr . Moss as to
whether or not the deed was part of the divorce proceed..
ingst and Mr. Moss testified as follows:
"THE COURT= Well~ is it your understand ...
ing from your conversation with these persons that
this deed was executed as a part of this divorce
proceeding and settlement of her property rights in
that divorce?
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A. Well the two coincidedt Judge~ and I am sure
that this deed grew out of this whole conversation.
However, I understand that he had executed the
deed and given it to her for the property.

THE COURT;
A.

For what reason?

Preparatory to the divorcer

THE COURT:

I see.

MR.. HYDE= And in consideration of
agreement to divorce bimt isntt that true?
A.

At least in part, yes."

her

(Tr. p. 62,1ines 25-30;
p. 63 ~ lines 1·8)

The letter of November 22, 1957, designated as ""Exhibit
rj is further evidence of both the understanding that Mr.
Moss, the attorney for Mrs4 Fuller,. had and the understanding that Mrs~ Fuller had of the delivery of this deed
into escrow; otherwiset there would have been no point in
Mr. Moss stating that Mrs. Fuller was willing to postpone
the action in order that the plaintiff•s credit would reflect
the ownership in the apartment house.. Pursuant to the
understanding of all partiest the deed was never delivered
into the possession of the deceased, and hence upon the
death of the deceased the title to the property passed to the
other joint tenant, the plaintiff in this action.

In the case of Phillips v4 Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 175
N4W. 144~ the grantor delivered a warranty deed into the
hands of a broker for the purpose of effecting a sale of a
property, the deed naming the broker as grantee4 The court
held this delivery was a conditional delivery, and that no
title passed thereby.. It can scarcely be imagined that if

Mrs . Fuller had renounced her agreement to seek the di·
vorc.e that Mr . Fuller would nonetheless have considered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the deed a present conveyance of the property which he

had purchased and maintained for so many years ..

In the case of Angell v.
~as

Ingtamm~

213 Pac . 2d, 944, it

held that an a_ttempted delivery of an instrument placed

in escrow by the escrow holder in violation of the terms
of the escrow agreement, passed no title to the property
to the grantee.

We submit that if Mrs . Porter or Mr. Moss had made
a delivery of the deed to Mrs. Fuller prior to· the time the
divorce was procured that the deed would have been ineffectual to pass title. This problem need not be faced,

however, since no delivery was ever- made by the escrow
holder, and at the time of death of Mrs. Fuller the documents were still held in escrow pursuant to the understanding and instructions of both parties .
The evidence clearly showsJ and the court so foundt
that Mr. Moss was advised that the parties were going to
proceed no further with tbe matter, whereupon Mr. Moss
billed Mrr Fuller far the work done to date, and the bill
was paid by the plaintifft Harold F. Fuller. The deed to
the ":t:Bu Street property remained in the file and was not

delivered to either party (Tr.
Findings of Fact).

P~

72; par+ 6 of the Court's

Following the death of Mrs . Fuller, the deed delivered
to Mr. Moss!s office was recorded. The defendant points

to the fact that the plaintiff thereafter wrote to his daughter who was the sole benefic~ary under the will of Mrs.
Fuller as if she was the owner of the property. What
would any ordinary lay person assume without having consulted with an attorney? The First Security Bank had
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taken the property over as part of the estate and had doubtless advised him that the legal effect of the giving of the

deed into escrow amounted to a legal conveyance.

uQ. Now since the death of your wife, who has
collected the rents?

A. Well~ the bank has been collecting the rents, the
Security Bank.

Q.. Have you ever objected to the Bank collecting
the rent?

A.. I didn,.t know my legal rights in this until I
talked to an attorney, my attorneyJ and naturally I
let them use high-handed methods and go ahead and
handle it and I didn~t know where I stood until I
talked to Gordon.~J ( Tr. p. 25, lines 1-9) .
(Italics supplied).
If the opinion of a lay person were the criterion of
what legal effect the court should give the transaction .then
the uncontradicted testimony as to what the daughter said

to her father would be significant:
"I told my daughter at the time it was a terrible thing
to happen and she said, ~well, Dad, it is your property. I don't want it;' t~ (Tr . p. 25! lines 21-23).
uShe said, 1 Dad I don,t want this property.. It is
your work. I don't want your home.',, (Tr. p. 25,
lines 27-30).

I submit that any lay person

~dvised by

the bank that the

title was lost to him under these circumstances would

probably believe that it was until advised otherwise by an
attorney and would doubtless have acted just as did this

plaintift
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The citations which the appellant uses to support its
position are all cases without relevance to the facts of this
case4 Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236., 117 P. 763 is
a case where the delivery was absolute and unconditional.
In the case before this court the deed was delivered as part
of the documents to effect a divorce proceeding which was
never completed and was discontinued at the request of the
grantee named in the deed. One of the reasons given by
the grantee herself and her lawyer for stopping the proceedings in this case was so that Mr. Fuller would retain
his interest in this very real estate until the following year.
(See Exhibit 7). (Tr. p. 35, lines 23-30).
In this case it was obviously the intent o£ Mrs. Fuller,
Mr~

Moss and Mr. Fuller that the delivery of the deed be

effected to pass title only when the divorce was obtained.
In none of the cases cited by appellant was there a
conditional delivery into escrow as was the case here. In
this case the deed was never given into the possession of
the deceased,. but was held in the attorney"s files pursuant
to agreement~ to be used only when and if the divorce was
obtained.. In all the cases cited the deeds were delivered
to the grantee or someone for the grantee with the intent
that they take effect when delivered. We have no argument with the decision in White v. Hendley, 35 Cal. App
267~ 169 p. 710~ where land was conveyed in consideration
for the grantee caring for the grantor. This case is not
applicable to facts where a deed is delivered into escrow,
not to take effect until the other papers are signed and
the divorce completed. Every day thousands of deeds are
delivered to attorneys~ banks, and escrow holders pursuant
to a contemplated transaction~it would be a monstrous
4
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result to hold that these deeds passed title and the grantee
named therein became vested with title even though the
transaction of which the deed was only a part did not go
through.
Counsel cites at page 32 of his brief the very distinction
between this case and all the cases cited :

u(7-9) as a general rule, a delivery of a deed
must be absolute and unconditional, unless it is in
escrow. Further it appears in {30) C.J.S. Title
Escrows, p. 7' also 21 C.J Is . ~ P· 873 note 96 P· 878
note 31, a delivery in escrow may be made only to a
third person not a party to the transaction, and there
can be no such delivery to the grantee upon a condition not expressed in the instrument/' (Appellant~s
Brief~ p. 32).
This language states the rule correctly.

In our case

the deed was not delivered to Mrs. Fuller although the
parties were negotiating directly between themselves and
it could have been had it been their intention to effect a
present conveyance of the property. The deed was delivered to the attorney~s secretary, Mrs. Portert who was
instructed to hold it with the other papers and to deliver it
to no one-not even Mrs. Fuller.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEW EVI-

DENCE ALLEGEDLY DISCOVERED AFTER
THE TRIAL OF CASEr

The defendant in its Brief argues that though acting
diligently it was unable to discover certain new evidence
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
which would have resulted in a different ruling by the trial
court. There is nothing set forth in the Affidavit upon
which the Motion was made that would excuse the defend·
ant from not discovering the alleged evidence prior to the
trial of the case.. The defendant had ample time for dis ..
covery and to examine and interrogate all witnesses having any knowledge of the transactiont and his failure to do
so would not permit him to reopen the case on the basis
of Rule 59. Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro·
cedure provides that the court in its discretion may order
a. new trial for the reason that newly discovered evidence
has been uncovered uwhich he could nott with reasonable
·diligencet have discovered and produced at the trial.'' There
is absolutely no showing of any reasonable diligence on the
part of the defendant to dis cover the alleged evidence .
The alleged evidence is of two types:

a) That the deed was actually delivered to Mrs . Fuller
on November 1.5, 1957.

b) That on March 3~ 1958t the mortgage on the uB'l'
Street property was increased and the money received was
loaned to the son of Mr. and Mrs. Fuller.
With reference to both alleged bits of evidencet there

was no showing made to the court of a reasonable cause
why the alleged evidence could not have been discovered
in the ordinary pre-trial discovery and produced at the
trial of the case. All of the witnesses who would have had
knowledge of such information were produced and examined
by both parties.. The alleged evidence that the deed had
been delivered to Mrs. Fuller was certainly contrary to all
of the evidence the witnesses produced both for the plaintiff and the defendant. Mrs. Phyllis Porter testified that
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the documents were never at any time released from her
file until after the death o£ Mrs. Fuller. An examination
of the Affidavit in support of the Motion will show no valid
grounds for the failure to produce the alleged evidence.
In regard to the fact that the parties on March 3~ 1958~

obtained a mortgage on the property and that the money
was loaned to their son) is a further indication that both
parties considered as of that time that they jointly owned
the property, and the alleged evidence that a note was given
by the son to his mother prior to her death would certainly
be inadmissible if offered to prove that the son considered
the property belonged to his rnother. It would not make
any difference what the son's opinion was, and there may
have been many reasons for his giving a note to his mother
which would be perfectly consistent with the view of the
court that the property remained the property of both
parties until the death of Mrs . Fuller .
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. SUCH EVIDENCE
WOULD IN ANY EVENT HAVE MADE NO
DIFFERENCE TO THE ULTIMATE DE·
CISION IN THIS CASE.
Counsel argues that the exclusion of the Fae L . Fuller

Will and the inventory were improperly

e~cluded

from the

evidence.. It is submitted that any person making a Will
would include in the Will the disposition of all their real
and personal property which they owned a.t the time of the
making of the Will, or which they anticipated receiving
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thereaftert and this would certainly be no evidence of the
status of the title as of the time of the death of the de~
cedent. Even had this been admitted~ it would have cer·
tainly not influenced the decision of the court in this case.

CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment in this case are £ully supported by
the evidence and that the court gave full c onsid era tion to
the evidence presented and to tbe Motion of the defendant
to grant a new trial~ and that the final decision in this case

was correct .
Respectfully submitted,

GORDON I. HYDE

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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